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SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY-OPERATION OF
U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) IN BANKRUPTCY-SECURED PARTY'S RIGHTS
TO NON-IDENTIFIABLE PROCEEDS UNDER CODE CONSTITUTES VOIDABLE
PREFERENCE-Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson
Products), 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976).
In Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson Products),"
the Ninth Circuit held, in a case of first impression, that the operation of
section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code),2 which
1. 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Jan.
1, 1977) (No. 76-1097).
2. In Gibson Products, the actual statute governing security interests in proceeds was
Alaz. REv. STAT. § 44-3127(D) (West 1967), as amended by Apiz. REv. STAT. § 44-
3127(D) (West. Supp. 1976). Its provisions were exactly the same as § 9-306(4) of
the Code as it existed prior to the 1972 amendments. It provided:
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected security
interest
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is not commin-
gled with other money or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolv-
ency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are
not deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash proceeds have
been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the perfected se-
curity interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash pro-
ceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of
the insolvency proceedings and commingled or deposited in a bank
account prior to the insolvency proceedings less the amount of cash
proceeds received by the debtor and paid over to the secured party
during the ten day period.
U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1968 version).
The court in Gibson Products used this earlier version and indicated that the 1972
amendments to the Code would not alter the result of the case. 543 F.2d at 653 n.1.
This casenote will use the 1972 version of § 9-306, except where the earlier version is
properly applicable. The revised section provides in pertinent part:
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection
or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss
or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a
person other than a party to the security agreement. Money, checks, deposit ac-
counts, and the like are "cash proceeds". All other proceeds are "non-cash pro-
ceeds".
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or other-
wise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds in [sic] a continuously perfected security
interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a
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provides for a perfected security interest-in commingled proceeds in the
event of insolvency, constituted a voidable preference within the mean-
ing of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.8 This has ended any utility
that section 9-306(4)(d) may have had in bankruptcy proceedings in
the Ninth Circuit.
. FACTS OF THE CASE
Gibson Products of Arizona was indebted to Arizona Wholesale
Supply Co. in the amount of $28,800 for household appliances which
Wholesale had sold to Gibson. Wholesale had a perfected security
perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the
proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds
are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the
office or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the
proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in
the financing statement indicates the types of property constituting the
proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds
are identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of
the ten day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds can be perfected
only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted in this Article for origi-
nal collateral of the same type.
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected security
interest only in the following proceeds:
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds and in separate deposit accounts contain-
ing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is neither com-
mingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the
insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are
not deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been
commingled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under
this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right to set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash pro-
ceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of
the insolvency proceedings less the sum of (I) the payments to the
secured party on account of cash proceeds received by the debtor
during such period and (11) the cash proceeds received by the debtor
during such period to which the secured party is entitled under para-
graphs (a) through (c) of this subsection (4).
U.C.C. § 9-306 (1972 version).
The 1972 revised version attempts to clarify some of the more obvious trouble spots,
without making any drastic textual changes. The new version adds the words "only in
the following proceeds" to make it clear that § 9-306(4) is the exclusive remedy upon
insolvency. The troublesome phrase "any cash proceeds" in § 9-306(4) (d) (ii) was re-
tained. See text accompanying notes 31-33, 39-42 infra. Section 9-306(4) (d) was al-
tered to require a showing by the secured party that at least some of his proceeds are
present in each bank account of the debtor in which the secured party claims an interest.
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
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interest in these appliances. Gibson declared bankruptcy on January
13, 1972. 4 In the ten day period prior to the institution of these
proceedings, Gibson deposited $19,505.27 in its bank account, only ten
dollars of which was shown to be derived from the sale of an appliance
in which Wholesale had a perfected security interest.5 Wholesale
claimed the entire $19,505.27 under section 9-306(4)(d) in opposition
to the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court
awarded judgment to Wholesale, the district court affirmed,' and the
trustee in bankruptcy appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that "the operation of U.C.C. Section 9-
306(4)(d) created a voidable preference by the transfer to the creditor
of a perfected security interest in the cash deposited in the debtor's
account that exceeded the amount of the creditor's proceeds."7
I". INTRODUCING THE CONTESTANTS
A. Secured Party's Right to Proceeds in Bankruptcy
Section 9-306 governs the secured party's interest in "proceeds."
Proceeds are defined as "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."" They are
further broken down into cash and non-cash proceeds. The former
includes money, checks, and deposit accounts, the latter includes all
other proceeds. 9 As a general rule, a perfected security interest in
collateral continues in any proceeds received in exchange for the collat-
eral." For example, if a finance company has a perfected security
interest" in a dealer's inventory, unless there has been an agreement
4. 543 F.2d at 654. Gibson initiated bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 301, 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). Chap-
ter XI proceedings are voluntary and are invoked by the debtor. Basically, they involve
a court-supervised method whereby a debtor can achieve a composition-extension with
his general creditors in order to gain financial rehabilitation. See generally 8 & 9
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 1.01-15.04 (14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1976) [herein-
after cited as COLLER]. There is usually no trustee in Chapter XI proceedings. For
reasons which are not explained, a trustee was appointed in Gibson Products.
5. 543 F.2d at 654-55.
6. Id. at 654.
7. Id.
8. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972 version).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 9-306(2) (1972 version). The secured party's Code rights appear to be co-
extensive with his pre-Code rights under U.C.C. § 9-306(2) & (3) (1972 version). See,
e.g., Girard Trust Comm. Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 25 Pa. D. & C.2d
395 (C.P. 1958); Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 35,
43-44 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Countryman].
11. This casenote will assume that a security interest has been duly perfected under
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to the contrary, the company also maintains its security interest in
cash, promissory notes, and trade-ins received by the dealer as a part
of the sale of the goods.
Of course, the secured party has to be able to identify his proceeds.
1 2
This is not a difficult hurdle if, for example, a buyer trades in his old car
and signs a promissory note. Problems arise when the debtor combines
cash received from the sale of collateral with his other funds. When such
commingling occurs, there is a division of authority over whether the
secured party retains his security interest. While it has been argued that
a security interest is lost once commingling occurs,13 the courts may
permit tracing14 to assist in the identification process.1 5
In bankruptcy today, however, a novel concept has been introduced
by section 9-306(4). Applicable only in the case of insolvency,16
whether instituted by the creditor or by the debtor, section 9-306(4) was
apparently designed to eliminate the need for extensive tracing. The
interest in identifiable (i.e., non-commingled) cash and non-cash pro-
ceeds continues under sections 9-306(4)(a), (b), and (c). Section
(4)(d), however, presents a new formula. It purports to give the
secured party an interest in commingled proceeds, which may or may
not have been traceable as proceeds of the collateral. This formula was
designed to be the exclusive remedy of the secured party in insolvency
proceedings, precluding any claim based on tracing even if the secured
creditor can trace more than the section 9-306(4)(d) formula gives
to him.'7
the Code at least four months prior to the date of bankruptcy, and that any steps neces-
sary to retain a perfected security interest in proceeds were taken. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
302 to 9-306(3), 9-401 to 9-403 (1972 version).
12. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972 version).
13. See G. GILMORE, SECUrrT INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PRORmaTY § 27.4, at 735-36
(1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
14. In most instances, "traceable" is equated with "identifiable." See Gillombardo,
The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Re-
draft of Section 9-306, 38 U. ON. L. REv. 1, 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gillom-
bardo]. However, these terms are not equatable under U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(b) & (c).
Under these sections, the proceeds received when collateral is disposed of must not be
commingled with other funds of the debtor. See GiLMoRE, supra note 13, § 45.9, at
1338.
15. See Countryman, supra note 10, at 44 n.22.
16. The Code defines insolvency proceedings rather broadly as "includ[ing] any as-
signment for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or reha-
bilitate the estate of the person involved. U.C.C. § 1-201(22). Thus, bankruptcy is
included.
17. See GILMORE, supra note 13, § 45.9, at 1338. In support of this position, the
1977]
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To determine the interest under section 9-306(4)(d),'8 the amount
of cash proceeds received by the debtor during the ten days before the
institution of bankruptcy must be ascertained. 19 The interpretation of
the phrase "any cash proceeds" in section (4)(d)(ii) is critical. It was
given an expansive reading by the court in Gibson Products.2" Once
this amount is determined, there must be deducted any cash proceeds
received by the debtor and paid over to the secured party during those
ten days,2" and the amounts to which the secured party is entitled under
sections (4)(a),(b), and (c). 22  Finally, a depository bank's rights of
set-off are deducted.2 3 The remaining sum constitutes the amount of
the section (4)(d) security interest in the general accounts of the
debtor.24  The secured party then must make an initial showing that at
least a portion of his proceeds is present in each commingled account of
the debtor in which he claims a section (4)(d) interest.
25
B. Power of Trustee to Avoid Preferential Transfers
Even a perfected security interest can be defeated by an attack from
the bankruptcy trustee's arsenal.26 The amount the secured party can
claim in a bankruptcy proceeding under section 9-306(4) (d) depends
not only on the interpretation of the (4)(d) interest, but in large part,
on the section's ability to withstand the trustee's power to avoid the
interest as a preferential transfer. Under section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the trustee must prove the elements of a voidable prefer-
ence. (1) A transfer; (2) of the debtor's property; (3) where the
creditor has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent
when the transfer is made; (4) for or on account of an antecedent debt;
official reasons given for the 1972 amendment to U.C.C. § 9-306(4) state that "[t]he
revised subsection (4) is a clarification based on the California revision. It makes clear
that the claim to cash allowed in insolvency is exclusive of any other claim based on
tracing." U.C.C. § 9-306 (1972 version) (Official Reasons for 1972 Change).
18. Professor Gilmore, a drafter of the Code, has recommended a three-step formula
to ascertain the sum of the secured party's interest in commingled funds in bankruptcy.
See GLMoRE, supra note 13, § 45.9, at 1338-39.
19. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii) (1972 version).
20. See text accompanying notes 31-33, 39-42 infra.
21. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii) (I) (1972 version).
22. Id. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii) (II).
23. Id. § 9-306(4)(d)(i).
24. For a discussion of whether the secured party's rights to proceeds prior to insol-
vency are equal to his rights after insolvency, see Gillombardo, supra note 14, at 23;
GiLMoRE, supra note 13, § 45.9, at 1339.
25. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (1972 version).
26. See note 43 infra.
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(5) within four months of bankruptcy; (6) the effect of which will
enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class.27  The Act also provides that a transfer
is "deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so
far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superi-
or to the rights of the transferee.""8
If a security interest attaches and is perfected in collateral more than
four months before bankruptcy, and the proceeds are identifiable under
sections 9-306(4) (a), (b), or (c), the security interest is safe from at-
tack by the trustee.2 9 However, when the proceeds are commingled,
the trustee might attack the interest arising under section 9-306(4)(d)
on the ground -that it is a voidable preference. Because the security
interest does not arise until the moment insolvency proceedings are
begun, the interest may be deemed a transfer on account of an antece-
dent debt at a time when the creditor probably had reason to know of
the debtor's insolvency. This is the attack which proved successful in
Gibson Products.
TII. REASONING OF THE COURT
The court cited Professor Gilmore's observation that section 9-306
(4)(d) was not meant to provide a windfall, but rather to "sharply [cut]
back the secured party's rights when insolvency proceedings are initi-
ated."30  Section 9-306(4)(d) would lighten the secured party's tracing
burden, but it would place a maximum on the sum which the secured
party could claim equal to the amount of cash proceeds received in the
ten day period prior to bankruptcy.
27. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). For a more detailed con-
sideration of each of the elements, see generally 3 COLLIER, supra note 4, 60.07-.35,
60.53. In Gibson Products, the court did not discuss whether the knowledge requirement
was met. Evidently, the court presumed that Wholesale would have reasonable cause
to know of Gibson's insolvency. It has been recommended that this requirement be
completely eliminated. See Comment, Voidable Preferences. An Analysis of the Pro-
posed Revisions of Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 481, 482.
28. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970).
29. Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson Products), 543 F.2d 652,
655 (9th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1977) (No.
76-1097).
30. Id. (quoting GILMORE, supra note 13, § 45.9, at 1337-38). According to the
court's reading of the drafters' intent, by limiting that which secured parties could claim
to an amount received during the last ten days before bankruptcy, it was assumed that
they would be entitled to a lesser sum than if they could trace funds deposited over a
longer period of time.
1977]
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The phrase "any cash proceeds" in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) was
interpreted to mean all cash receipts from any source received by the
debtor in the ten day period prior to bankruptcy.8 ' The court explicitly
rejected the interpretation given in Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance
Corp., 2 where the Seventh Circuit interpreted the phrase in conjunction
with the definition of proceeds in section 9-306(1) and limited it to
"cash proceeds from the sale of collateral in which the creditor had a
security interest." 8
Under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, Wholesale would have re-
ceived a windfall to the detriment of general creditors. However, this
possibility was eliminated by the application of section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The court enumerated the various elements of a preference,
including a discussion of "transfer" in section 60a(2). 4  The court
then applied these elements to the facts. Wholesale's interest in the
31. 543 F.2d at 656.
32. 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974). In Fitzpatrick, the Seventh Circuit considered
a fact situation similar to Gibson Products. Philco had extended a credit line of
$275,000 to the debtor, a retail appliance dealer, and taken a security interest in the ap-
pliances. During the ten days prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings,, the
debtor paid Philco $44,766.84 from its general account. The trustee in bankruptcy
proved that in those ten days $4,513.44 had been received by the debtor as proceeds
from the sale of Philco's collateral. The trustee argued that under § 9-306(4)(d),
Philco's security interest in proceeds was limited to the proceeds received by the debtor
in the ten days prior to bankruptcy-here, only the $4,513.44. The Seventh Circuit
agreed, finding that $40,253.40 of the $44,766.84 already paid to Philco constituted a
voidable preference. Id. at 1292.
The court's reasoning seems patently incorrect. Section 9-306(4) (d) should not have
been applied to the $40,253.40 already paid to the secured party by the debtor. The
section does not act as a limit on funds paid to the secured party in the ten day period.
It merely requires that, to the extent that the proceeds were received by the debtor and
paid over during the ten day period, they are to be deducted from the cash proceeds
which the debtor received in the ten day period. In regards to the $40,253.40 paid to
Philco, the question which should have been considered was not whether § 9-306(4) (d)
acted as a limit, but simply whether it constituted a voidable preference.
The trustee did not attempt to void Philco's interest in the $4,513.44. The court noted
that it was surprised at the omission of this argument given the voluminous literature
on the subject of the invalidity of section 9-306(4)(d) in bankruptcy. Since the issue
was not raised, the court did not consider it. Id. at 1292 n.4. Thus, the court in Gib-
son Products was the first to face the issue.
33. Id. at 1292.
34. Under an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling, the court had held that a "transfer" for
purposes of § 60a(2) was "equated with the act by which priority over later creditors
is achieved and not with the event which attaches the security interest to a specific ac-
count." 543 F.2d at 656 (quoting DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir.
1969)). In Gibson Products, this "act" would be the institution of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, for it is only at that time § 9-306(4) is applicable. One noted commentator has
criticized the theory of transfer in DuBay. See Countryman, supra note 10, at 53-55,
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fund, and its priority over later creditors, did not arise "until (1) some
part of Wholesale's proceeds were deposited with other cash in Gibson's
bank account, (2) within ten days of Gibson's filing its Chapter XI
petition.""5  A transfer for or on account of an antecedent debt has
therefore occurred, because "Wholesale could not qualify for Section 9-
306(4) treatment absent the antecedent debt."36 Since the requisite
elements were satisfied, the transfer of the excess, above Wholesale's
proceeds, was declared a preference.31 In order to rebut the presump-
tion of a preference, the court required the secured party to trace his
interest into the commingled funds. 8
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. Interpretation of "Any Cash Proceeds"
The court interpreted the phrase "any cash proceeds" in section 9-
306(4)(d)(ii) to mean all cash receipts from any source received by
the debtor in the ten day period prior to bankruptcy. The court
reasoned:
The statute divides "proceeds" into two categories, "identifiable" and
"comingled," i.e., nonidentifiable proceeds, and alters the reach of a
perfected security interest, depending upon whether the proceeds are
identifiable or nonidentifiable. . . . Section 9-306(4)(d) deals only
with nonidentifiable cash proceeds. If the cash proceeds could be
"identified," i.e., had not been commingled, the secured party would
have a perfected security interest in the whole fund under Section
9-306(4) (b), just as he did in pre-Code days, without any of the lim-
itations imposed by Section 9-306(4)(d). Under the Code scheme,
the secured creditor also has a perfected security interest under sub-
section (d) when he cannot identify his proceeds in the commingled
fund, as long as he can show that some of his proceeds were among
those in the commingled fund.39
The court's reasoning is obscure. While the statements are valid as
far as they go, it is still difficult to understand why the court believes the
35. 543 F.2d at 656-57.
36. Id. at 657.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 656.
1977]
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definition of proceeds should vary depending on whether the proceeds
are identifiable or commingled. Proceeds is a term of art, specifically
defined in section 9-306(1) and limited to whatever is received when
collateral is exchanged or sold. By construing the phrase to mean all
cash receipts from any source, the court has given proceeds two separate
meanings within the same section, without any solid justification that the
drafters intended such a result.40 Under section 9-306(1), the term pro-
ceeds is explicitly given a narrow reading, while under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of section 9-306(4)(d), it is given an extremely
broad one.
If the idea of section 9-306(4)(d) was to give secured parties an inter-
est in all cash receipts from any source, whether or not they were actual
proceeds of the creditor, the secured party would receive a benefit
unavailable outside of insolvency or in pre-Code days. Section 9-306
(4)(d) operates like a presumption. To the extent that a creditor can
show a certain amount of his proceeds were received in the ten day
period prior to insolvency, and if they are not identifiable under sections
9-306(4)(a), (b), and (c), these proceeds are presumably present in the
debtor's commingled cash and bank accounts. Requiring the secured
party to show that a portion of his proceeds, no matter how small an
amount, are present in the commingled accounts in which he claims a
section 9-306(4)(d) interest augments the validity of the "presumption."
The proceeds of the secured party received in the ten day period would
almost always constitute a smaller sum than the secured party could
claim if he had a grasp of the commingled accounts of the debtor for an
indefinite period of time.41 Under the broad interpretation, there is far
greater likelihood that the secured party will receive an interest (poten-
tially a windfall) in funds which are not derived from the sale of his
collateral, a result hardly intended by the drafters of the Code. Of
course, the court avoided this result by concluding that the section
40. Generally, "[ijn the absence of express restriction it may be assumed that a term
is used throughout a statute in the same sense in which it is first defined." Pampanga
Sugar Mills v. Trinidad, 279 U.S. 211, 218 (1929). There is a presumption that the
words used in one part of a legislative enactment are intended to have the same mean-
ing as the identical words used in another part of the act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). This presumption yields if the words
are employed in such dissimilar circumstances as to indicate they were employed with
different intent. Id. There is absolutely no indication that any intent to construe pro-
ceeds in two different ways within the same section was present. Indeed, Professor Gil-
more seems to assume that the terms "proceeds" in "any cash proceeds" means just that,
as he makes no indication to the contrary. See GYLMoRE, supra note 13, § 45.9,
at 1338-39.
41. 543 F.2d at 655-56 (citing Gn.Monn, supra note 13, § 45.9, at 1340).
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9-306(4) (d) interest was presumptively a preference and imposing a
tracing requirement. The extent of the tracing required or permitted
was not discussed.
42
Under either interpretation the court would have reached the same
result due to the requirement of tracing. To illustrate, let us assume
facts similar to those in Gibson Products. In the ten day period prior to
bankruptcy, $19,000 is received from all sources and deposited by the
debtor. Only ten dollars of this amount is shown to be proceeds of the
secured party's collateral. Using the court's interpretation, the secured
party would have a security interest in all $19,000, but it would pre-
sumptively be a preference and voided by the trustee. The secured party
could then trace its proceeds into the commingled accounts and claim
ten dollars. If the narrower definition were adopted, the secured party
would have a security interest in ten dollars, which would be presump-
tively a preference, but which could likewise be traced after the pre-
sumption was applied. The Ninth Circuit has thus taken a circuitous
and unwarranted approach because the same result could have been
achieved by adopting the narrow interpretation of "any cash proceeds."
B. The Finding of Voidable Preference
By finding a voidable preference, the court has aligned itself with a
number of commentators who have speculated about the clash.43 How-
42. In describing the function of § 9-306(4), Gibson Products stated that (4) (d) was
intended to "eliminate the expense and nuisance of tracing." 543 F.2d at 655. However,
the court later provided that "[tlo the extent a creditor is able to identify his proceeds
to trace their path into the commingled funds, he will be able to defeat pro tanto the
trustee's assertion of a preference." Id. at 657. This would appear to impose a more
extensive tracing requirement than first recognized by Gibson Products or intended by
the drafters of § 9-306. The comments to an earlier version of § 9-306 stated that the
secured party has a security interest in cash proceeds under (4) (d) "without regard
to whether or not the funds are identifiable as cash proceeds of the collateral." U.C.C.
§ 9-306 (1968 version) (Official Comment 2). The comments to the latest version pro-
vide that "4(a) through (c) substitute specific rules of identification for general princi-
ples of tracing" and that 4(d) acts as a limit on "the security interest in proceeds not
within these rules." U.C.C. § 9-306 (1972 version) (1972 Official Comment 2). See
notes 18-25, 41 supra, and accompanying text.
43. Several authorities have argued that the § 9-306(4) (d) interest is vulnerable as a
preference. See, e.g., 4A COLLIER, supra note 4, q 70.62A, at 710; Countryman, supra
note 10, at 49 & n.35; Epstein, "Proceeding" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30
Omo ST. L.J. 787, 803-07 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Epstein]; Gillombardo, supra
note 14, at 29; Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of
1966, 42 WASH. L. REv. 681, 716-17 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Marsh].
Other possible areas of conflict between § 9-306(4) (d) and the Bankruptcy Act
are:
tl) Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) (priorities). See, e.g., 4A
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ever, theories have been developed to withstand the trustee's attack. 44
The most prominent of these are the "entity" theory and the "substitu-
tion of collateral" theory.
Under the entity theory, 45 the property which is subject to a security
interest is viewed as a mass or entity which is continuously in existence.
Even though the various units or portions of this mass may change in
form, the identity of the property subject to the security interest is not
altered. Thus, whether in the form of original collateral, proceeds of
collateral, or section 9-306(4)(d) proceeds, the transfer is considered
to have taken place when the perfected security interest attaches to the
original portions of the mass.4 6 If this occurred more than four months
prior to filing bankruptcy, there can be no preference.
It is difficult to see how this theory can be successfully applied to the
section 9-306(4)(d) interest, since the (4)(d) proceeds may or may
not actually be part of of the original mass, 47 and language in Gibson
COLLM, supra note 4, 70.62A, at 710; Countryman, supra note 10, at 47-48; Epstein,
supra at 796-99; Gillombardo, supra note 14, at 29; Hawkland, The Proposed Amend-
ments to Article 9 of the UCC, Part HI: Proceeds, 77 CoM. L.J. 12, 18 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Hawkland]; Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
65 COLtM. L. REv. 232, 243-45 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Henson]; Kennedy, The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency: Article 9, 67 CoM. L.J. 113,
116 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
(2) Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 67(c) (1) (A), II U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (A) (1970) (stat-
utory lien). See, e.g., 4A COLLIER, supra note 4, f 70.62A, at 710; Countryman, supra
note 10, at 48; Epstein, supra at 799-801; Gillombardo, supra note 14, at 29; Hawkland,
supra at 18; Henson, supra at 247; Kennedy, supra at 117; Marsh, supra at 715-16; Com-
ment, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential Conflicts, 53 Nw.
U.L. REv. 411, 421-24 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Potential Conflicts].
(3) Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970) (rights' and powers
of trustee). See, e.g., 4A COLIER, supra note 4, 1 70.62A, at 710; Countryman, supra
note 10, at 48-49; Epstein, supra at 801-03; Gillombardo, supra note 14, at 28; Hawk-
land, supra at 18-19; Henson, supra at 247; Kennedy, supra at 115-16; Marsh, supra
at 716.
(4) Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1970) (validity of transfer).
See, e.g., Gillombardo, supra note 14, at 28; Hawkland, supra at 18; Henson, supra at
247.
44. Courts and commentators have attempted to apply theories to the 9-306(4)
(d) interest which have been successful in upholding after-acquired property provisions
against invalidity in bankruptcy. These theories have given rise to the floating lien con-
cept. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants
of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
827 (1969); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967); In re White,
283 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Countryman, supra note 10, at 53-57.
45. See Henson, supra note 43, at 248-52.
46. See Hawkland, supra note 43, at 18-19; Henson, supra note 43, at 248-52.
47. See Epstein, supra note 43, at 804-05. Epstein also notes that it is questionable
whether the entity theory was adopted by the Code. Id. at 805 n.82.
RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Products indicates that the interest arises anew upon initiation of insol-
vency proceedings. 8
The substitution of collateral theory involves the concept of original
collateral being replaced by substitute collateral as proceeds: "(1) The
substitution of the new security interest must be prior to or contem-
poraneous with the release of the old, and (2) the value of the substitut-
ed collateral may not exceed the value of that replaced-if it does, the
excess is preferential." 49 If these criteria are met, the security interest
will prevail against section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, even if it occurs
within four months of bankruptcy.50 This theory may have some merit.
Upon insolvency, the section 9-306(4)(d) interest arises simultaneously
with the loss of interest in identifiable, i.e., traceable, but commingled
funds. To the extent that the section (4)(d) interest is less than or equal to
the interest prior to insolvency, there has been no preferential transfer.
There would be, however, a transfer, and hence a voidable preference,
as to any amounts which are in excess of the secured party's interest
prior to insolvency.51
In Gibson Products the court did not merely find a preference and
void the interest completely. Because the secured party was allowed to
trace his interest to defeat the presumption of a preference, the section
9-306(4)(d) interest is ultimately preferential only as to the amount in
excess of the secured party's own proceeds. Though it never explicitly
mentioned the substitution of collateral theory, by its tracing require-
ment the court has in effect employed this theory.
V. THE EFFECT ON STATE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
The interpretation in Gibson Products of "any cash proceeds" would
have great effect on the secured party's interest in state insolvency
proceedings, such as an assignment for the benefit of creditors, if the
state courts were to find the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation persua-
sive. Since the state insolvency proceedings have no provisions analo-
48. "The] interest in these nonproceeds arises upon the occurrence of two events:
(1) insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, and (2) commingling of
some of the proceeds from his collateral with the debtor's cash on hand or with other
deposits in his debtor's bank account." 543 F.2d at 655. See also Countryman, supra
note 10, at 49, where he states: "Mhe transfer of the security interest in [nonidentifiable
proceeds] to the secured creditor is not under Section 60a(2) deemed made until bank-
ruptcy-which is, after all, exactly what Section 9-306(4) (d) says."
49. Countryman, supra note 10, at 44-45 (footnotes omitted).
50. Id. at 44.
51. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 10, at 49 n.35; Epstein, supra note 43, at 806-
07; Potential Conflicts, supra note 43, at 421 n.54.
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gous to section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 2 a secured party would be
more likely to gain a windfall to the detriment of other creditors. The
irony in this result, of course, is that the Ninth Circuit expressly intend-
ed to prevent a windfall. Hopefully, the state courts, when faced with
the issue, will adopt an interpretation in accordance with the drafters'
intent and with proper statutory construction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gibson Products, the Ninth Circuit addressed the long-anticipated
clash between section 9-306(4)(d) of the Code and section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act. The interest arising under section 9-306(4)(d) was
held to be a voidable preference to the extent that the interest exceeded
the amount the secured party could trace as his proceeds. The decision
ends any real usefulness that the section may have had in bankruptcy
proceedings in the Ninth Circuit. The court expressly imposed a trac-
ing requirement without specifying the extent of the requirement, while
continuing to limit the secured party's maximum grasp to an amount
equal to the cash proceeds received in the ten day period prior to
bankruptcy. In addition, the court's interpretation of "any cash pro-
ceeds" in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) appears to be incorrect. Since a
similar interpretation in state insolvency proceedings would produce a
potential windfall to the secured party, it should be rejected by state
courts. Finally, Gibson Products illustrates the dangers of commingled
accounts. Secured parties would be well-advised to include a provision
in the security agreement requiring the debtor to maintain separate
accounts. Further, secured parties should vigilantly police debtor's
accounts if possible.
Susan K. Knowles*
52. At common law, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a debtor can prefer one
creditor over another. See, e.g., Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U.S. 476 (1893); Union Bank
v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U.S. 223 (1890); Bumb v. Bennett, 51 Cal. 2d 294, 333 P.2d
23 (1958); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432 (West 1970). In some states there are statutory
schemes for an assignment for the benefit of creditors which prohibit the preference
of one creditor over another. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3457 (West 1970). This
definition of preference, however, is not analogous to that in the Bankruptcy Act. See
text accompanying note 27 supra.
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Lloyd Tevis, Professor of Law,
Loyola of Los Angeles School of Law, for his assistance on this casenote.
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